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INTRODUCTION
Consider two retired neighbors each having about $4 million in
assets.1 One of these neighbors goes to her lawyer, who encourages
1. Assume neither of these neighbors is married. If either were, all property
included in the gross estate that passed to the surviving spouse would be eligible for the
marital deduction in computing the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes. See
I.R.C. § 2056 (2000). Other deductions available to reduce the federal estate tax include
charitable deductions, mortgages and debt, and the estate's administration expenses and
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her to transfer most of these assets to a family limited partnership
("FLP"), a limited liability entity recognized under the laws of all fifty
states that can be used for facilitating asset protection, asset pooling,
and centralizing investment management. This neighbor takes her
lawyer's advice, and when she dies in 2006, her estate claims a fifty
percent discount for lack of control and marketability2 of the
taxpayer's family limited partnership interests. After the discount,
her estate is valued at about $2 million. The estate pays no estate tax
in 2006' because a tax credit of $2 million is applied to the estates of
decedents dying in the year 2006.4 Two years later, this neighbor's
children liquidate the family limited partnership and, disregarding
any appreciation and income, are left with $4 million-the same
amount they would have inherited if their mother had not placed her
assets into a family limited partnership but with the benefit of the
valuation discount that allowed her estate to escape estate taxation.
The other neighbor does not go to a lawyer. He also dies in 2006,
but because he did not transfer his assets to a family limited
partnership like his neighbor, he can claim no valuation discounts.
Two million dollars of his estate is exempted from estate taxation,5
but the other $2 million will be taxed at a marginal rate of forty-six
percent.6 His estate will pay over $900,000 in taxes. This triumph of
losses during estate administration. See Internal Revenue Service, Estate Tax Questions,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=108143,00.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2005).
2. Because a hypothetical willing buyer would be unwilling to pay the fair market
value of underlying assets where he lacks control or cannot sell his interest in those assets,
a discount for lack of control and marketability is appropriate. See Bradford Updike,
Making Sense of Family Limited Partnership Law After Strangi and Stone: A Better
Approach to Planning and Litigation Through the Bona Fide Transaction Exception, 50
S.D. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2005).
3. Internal Revenue Code § 2001(a) imposes a tax "on the transfer of the taxable
estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States." I.R.C.
§ 2001(a). To determine the taxable estate, the Code defines "gross estate" as "the value
at the time of [the decedent's] death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated." Id. § 2031. Then, exemptions and credits are allowed from
the gross estate. See Brent R. Bissonnette, Getting It Right: Avoiding the Seven Deadly
Sins in the Formation and Management of the Family Limited Partnership, 30 OHIo N.U.
L. REV. 59, 60 (2004). The most significant credit is the "unified credit," which for
decedents dying in 2006 is an exclusion of $2 million from the estate. See § 2010.
4. Thus, any decedent dying in 2006 with a gross estate of $2 million or less will not
owe any federal estate tax. See § 2010(c) (defining the applicable credit amount, that is,
the amount of an estate's assets exempted from estate taxation).
5. See id. The $2 million will be exempted from estate taxation because it represents
the "applicable credit amount." An estate is essentially credited with that amount.
Estates smaller than $2 million pay no estate tax and estates larger than $2 million do not
pay tax on the first $2 million.
6. See § 2001(c). The "marginal rate" of tax is "the applicable rate of tax at each
bracket level." Id. A taxpayer's "marginal rate" generally refers to the highest marginal
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form over substance7 has the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS")
grasping at the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") for any plausible
relief.
The discrepancy in the taxes paid by the hypothetical retired
neighbors is a national concern. The estate tax is an important
revenue-raising tool for the federal government.8 As wealthy baby
boomers age, the estate tax's potential for revenue-raising will only
grow. Therefore, as years go by and more Americans accumulate
wealth, age, and die, the government either will or will not be able to
collect federal estate taxes depending on the form in which the
neighbors hold their assets, not on the substance of what they own.
Thus, how FLP assets are treated for estate tax purposes in the years
ahead will make a significant difference in the estate tax revenue that
the federal government can collect.
rate of tax that taxpayer pays. Contrast "marginal rate" with the "effective rate" of tax,
which is the rate "applicable to the taxpayer's income as a whole." See MARVIN A.
CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 5-6 (9th ed. 2002).
7. The triumph of form over substance is a result that the Internal Revenue Service
generally seeks to avoid. See Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Economic Substance in the
Context of Federal Estate and Gift Tax: The Internal Revenue Service Has It Wrong, 64
MONT. L. REV. 389, 389-90, 396-97 (2003). Rather, to be respected for federal tax
purposes, a transfer must have economic substance beyond simply tax avoidance. Id. at
390. Professor Gagliardi argues for a different approach to economic substance in the
context of estate planning. Id. at 391-94, 401-34. She suggests that in the context of estate
planning, wealth transfer tax savings are necessarily a motivating factor and transfers have
a donative, rather than business, purpose. Id. at 392. Thus, her approach favors objective
factors including whether an economic benefit has been transferred, whether that benefit
is based on an enforceable legal right, and whether objective actions of the parties
implement these rights and respect the economic benefits. Id. at 393, 401-15.
8. Repealing the estate tax would cost the federal government an estimated $256
billion over the years 2006-2015. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2006 REVENUE PROPOSALS 159 (2005); see
also Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 901, 115 Stat. 38,150 (codified in scattered section of 25 U.S.C.) (providing that the 2001
Tax Act will not apply to estates of decedents dying after December 31, 2010). Some
critics of the estate tax state that it represents a very small part of federal revenues. See
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 295 (3d ed. 2004) (pointing out, in a discussion of the pros and cons
of the estate tax, that the estate tax brought in only about 1.4 percent of federal revenues
in 2001 but that this represented a "nontrivial portion of the tax burden placed on upper-
income people"). Eliminating transfer taxes--of which the estate tax is one-however,
would require additional taxes elsewhere to make up these lost revenues or would result in
cutting government spending on programs or increasing national debt. See Charles
Davenport & Jay A. Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk, 84 TAX NOTES 591, 593
(1999); see also John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (2002) (arguing, while not wholeheartedly endorsing the current federal
transfer tax system, that such a tax on wealth is an appropriate way to "contribute to
greater progressivity in taxation, ... encourage charitable contributions, and raise
significant revenues").
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Beyond the lost revenue for the government that FLPs allow,
abuses of FLPs offend principles of fairness and equity. Like the
example of the neighbors offered in this Introduction, sophisticated
taxpayers with savvy lawyers have an unfair advantage over others in
that by choosing the right form in which to hold their assets, they can
avoid or minimize estate taxation.
FLPs are popular estate planning tools that have been used to
substantially reduce estate, gift, and income taxes9; to protect assets
from creditors"; and to expediently transfer wealth." Estate planners
advise their clients to put assets, including "cash, stock, and real
estate," into these limited partnerships and then to claim large
valuation discounts for estate and gift tax purposes. 2 Limited
partnership interests are valued for tax purposes "at what a
hypothetical, unrelated buyer would pay for them" and, thus, are
discounted because the limited partners lack control of the underlying
assets and because the limited partnership interests are not readily
marketable. 3 Starting in the mid-1990s, the IRS began aggressively
targeting FLPs using various provisions of the Code to attempt to
eliminate these valuation discounts or to return the gifted limited
partnership interests to an estate, largely without success."
After years of unsuccessful challenges to FLPs, the IRS seems to
have discovered a weapon that can be successful if properly
wielded-§ 2036(a)(1)"5 of the Internal Revenue Code. 6  Section
2036(a)(1) operates to include in the gross estate of a decedent the
value of all property transferred during the decedent's life over which
the decedent maintained the possession or enjoyment or the right to
income, unless such transfer was a bona fide sale for adequate and
9. See generally Troy Renkemeyer, Comment, The Family Limited Partnership: An
Effective Estate Planning Tool, 64 UMKC L. REv. 587 (1996) (offering an overview of
FLPs and comparing them to similar entities).
10. See S. Stacy Eastland, Family Limited Partnerships: Non-Transfer Tax Benefits,
PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 10, 11.
11. Reed W. Easton, Courts Disagree on Application of Section 2036 Exception to
FLPs, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Jan. 2005, at 35, 41.
12. Janet Novack, Cut Your Estate Tax in Half, FORBES, Oct. 19, 1998, at 160, 160.
13. Id. (emphasis omitted).
14. Louis A. Mezzullo, Fifth Circuit's Remand in Kimbell Does Not Provide Carte
Blanche for All FLPs, 101 J. TAX'N 41, 41 (2004); Leslie A. Droubay, Comment, The
Certainty of Death and Taxes for Family Limited Partnerships, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 523, 526-28 (2003) (summarizing unsuccessful IRS challenges to FLPs); John W.
Porter, FLP Wars Update, TR. & EST., July 2005, at 49, 49-50 (discussing unsuccessful IRS
challenges to FLPs).
15. Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended.
16. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2000); Droubay, supra note 14, at 528.
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full consideration.17 Thus, the IRS has argued in certain cases that
decedents "effectively retained the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property transferred to the
partnership." 8  Therefore, in cases addressing the application of
§ 2036(a)(1) to FLP assets, the issues usually are: "(1) whether the
creation of the partnership and transfer of assets to it was a 'bona fide
sale for full and adequate consideration' and, if not, (2) whether the
decedent retained the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property transferred to the partnership.
'" 19
This Comment suggests that FLPs can be used abusively as tax
shelters but that the IRS's latest weapon against FLPs, § 2036, is an
inappropriate way to deal with the problem. As this Comment will
show, whether § 2036 applies in any given context is a heavily fact-
dependent inquiry2° with the IRS seemingly targeting only those cases
presenting "bad facts,' courts awkwardly shoehorning the facts into
§ 2036(a), and courts defining the bona fide sale exception in different
ways. With guidance from the various courts that have addressed the
issue, sophisticated estate planners and their clients can still structure
an FLP or a similar entity to accomplish tax avoidance goals. A
17. See § 2036(a), (a)(1).
18. Porter, supra note 14, at 50.
19. See id. at 50, 54 n.6 (emphasis omitted) (citing Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1641 (2002); Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478 (2000), affd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002); Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114
T.C. 144 (2000)).
20. See J. Joseph Korpics, How Estate Planners Can Use Bongard To Their
Advantage, EST. PLAN. J., July 2005, at 32, 38; Droubay, supra note 14, at 532.
21. See, e.g., Strangi v. Comm'r, 417 F.3d 468, 472, 478 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that
§ 2036(a)(1) applied where the ailing decedent transferred over $10 million worth of assets
into FLPs, which made monetary and in-kind outlays to the decedent to meet his needs);
Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
§ 2036(a)(1) applied where the decedent was ninety-five years old when two FLPs were
created, he transferred nearly all his assets to the FLPs, and there was little economic
purpose for the FLPs beyond tax avoidance); Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 259
(5th Cir. 2004) (holding that § 2036(a)(1) did not apply where the IRS sought to return
assets that an elderly decedent had transferred to an FLP late in her life).
Generally, facts referred to as "bad facts"-those that can entice the IRS to
challenge an FLP under § 2036 and courts to accept such a challenge-include: (1) the
decedent's transfer of nearly all of her assets to the FLP; (2) the decedent's transfer of her
residence to the FLP while continuing to live in it without paying rent to the FLP; (3) the
decedent's commingling of her assets with those of the FLP; (4) the decedent or her
estate's use of the FLP's assets; and (5) a lack of change in management of the property
after it is transferred to the FLP. See Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of Disappearing
Wealth Revisited. Using Family Limited Partnerships To Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, 1
PIrT. TAX REV. 155, 183-85 (2004). By contrast, § 2036's application to FLPs is unlikely if
the above "bad facts" are avoided through careful and diligent planning. See infra notes
162-67, 264-68 and accompanying text.
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remedy for the potential abuses of FLPs is desirable; however, such a
remedy should be legislative and come from Congress, not from the
IRS simply reviewing estates to find those with facts bad enough to
warrant § 2036(a)(1) application.
Part I of this Comment discusses FLPs in greater detail,
explaining how they are formed and how FLP interests are valued. z
Part II chronicles the IRS's failed attacks on valuation discounts of
FLP interests. These attacks include arguments that FLPs lack
economic substance and that decedents make taxable gifts upon
formation of an FLP; the IRS has also tried to use specific Code
provisions to defeat FLPs. Part III discusses § 2036(a)(1)'s early
application to FLP interests and the IRS's success in the Tax Court
using § 2036(a)(1). Part IV discusses the uncertainty as to what
"bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration" means in
§ 2036(a)(1) after recent decisions in the Fifth and Third Circuits and
the Tax Court have come to seemingly different results. In Kimbell v.
United States23 and Strangi v. Commissioner,24 the Fifth Circuit held
that receipt of proportionate interests in an FLP for transferred assets
constitutes "adequate and full consideration" under § 2036.25
However, the Third Circuit may require that the interests received by
a decedent who transfers assets to an FLP have the same value as the
transferred assets.26  Because FLP interests are not readily
marketable and an owner does not necessarily possess the right to
control the underlying assets, proportionate interests will usually have
less monetary value than the transferred assets unencumbered by the
partnership agreement.27 Furthermore, these decisions along with the
recent Tax Court case Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner"8 create
22. For a discussion on FLPs, trusts, and limited liability corporations and their
desirability for tax and estate planning purposes, including asset protection, tax savings,
and control issues, see generally Timothy R. Baumann, Note, Family Limited Partnerships,
Trusts, or Limited Liability Corporations: Which Should the Elderly Choose?, 3 ELDER L.
J. 111 (1995).
23. 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004).
24. 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005).
25. See Strangi, 417 F.3d at 478; Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 265.
26. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381; id. at 386-87 (Greenberg, J., concurring). In some
literature, Thompson is referred to as Turner v. Commissioner. See, e.g., Porter, supra
note 14, at 51 (referring to Thompson as the Turner case). Theodore Thompson was the
decedent in the case; Betsy Turner, his daughter, was the executor of the estate.
Thompson, 382 F.3d at 369. In this Comment, the case will be referred to consistently as
Thompson.
27. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381.
28. 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 124.8, at 124-54 (T.C. Mar. 15, 2005). The
Bongard decision will be found in the United States Tax Reports at Estate of Bongard v.
2006]
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uncertainty regarding what motivation or purpose a transfer must
have to be considered a "bona fide sale" under § 2036.29 After these
cases, it is, of course, still possible to form an FLP that would
withstand scrutiny by the IRS cr a court.3° However, at the margins,
uncertainty reigns.31 Therefore, Part V of this Comment provides
suggestions for what Congress should do to change the current law to
resolve the uncertainties and to prevent possible abuses of FLPs and
similar entities, proposing that a new Code provision that limits
discounts for family entities when they are used as tax shelters is in
order.
I. FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS EXPLAINED
A. Formation of a Family Limited Partnership
FLPs, along with other limited partnerships, are defined by state
statutes, often modeled after the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act.32 An FLP is formed when at least two people file a
certificate that meets state law requirements with the Secretary of
State's office in a jurisdiction.33 The FLP will usually have one or
more general partners and one or more limited partners.34 Typically,
tax planning with an FLP involves a transfer of assets to a partnership
by the senior generation in exchange for two types of partnership
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95 (2005), but citations to that source were not available at the
time of printing.
29. Id. at 124-69. To be a bona fide sale, the Tax Court held that there must be a
"legitimate and significant non-tax reason" for the FLP's creation. Id. It is not entirely
clear what reasons will suffice as "legitimate and significant" or what constitutes a "bona
fide sale" in the Fifth and Third Circuits. See J. Joseph Korpics, Qualifying New FLPs for
the Bona Fide Sale Exception: Managing Thompson, Kimbell, Harper, and Stone, 102 J.
TAX'N 111, 112 (2005).
30. See Korpics, supra note 29, at 112; see, e.g., Estate of Schutt v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1353, 1367-68 (2005) (determining that the decedent's transfer of assets to two
family entities were bona fide sales because there existed a "legitimate and significant
non-tax reason"-perpetuation of a long-standing investment philosophy-for the
transfer).
31. For example, although Kimbell, Thompson, and Bongard indicate that any "non-
tax benefit" is a legitimate business reason sufficient to satisfy the bona fide sale
exception, the courts often find on the facts that such benefits are insufficient. See
Korpics, supra note 29, at 116-17.
32. See generally REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP AcT (1976) (amended 1985); Baumann,
supra note 22 (comparing several entities and their benefits, including potential valuation
benefits, and drawbacks).
33. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 201.
34. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 65 (2003) (explaining that limited partnerships have two classes
of partners, including one or more general partners and one or more limited partners).
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interests: general partnership interests and limited partnership
interests."
The general partner or partners have the power to do anything
partners in a partnership without limited partners can do.36 However,
general partners, unlike limited partners, are personally liable for the
partnership's debts.37 Limited partners contribute assets, including
cash or other property or services, in exchange for partnership
interests but have no control over partnership affairs.38 Usually, the
general partnership interests have very little economic value but carry
with them plenary control of the FLP.39 The limited partnership
interests are just the opposite-no control whatsoever but most of the
economic value.40 The limited partnership interests may be retained
by the senior generation until death or given to a younger generation
during the senior generation's lifetime.41
B. Valuation Discounts
One of the primary reasons for forming an FLP, and the one with
which this Comment is most concerned, is the potential valuation
discounts available for estate and gift tax purposes.42 However, there
are also other benefits to using FLPs, including creditor protection,43
promotion of wealth retention within families,' administrative
expediency,45 and avoidance of probate.46 Valuation discounts are
35. See Updike, supra note 2, at 5-7; Droubay, supra note 14, at 525.
36. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 34, at 65 (noting that general partners in a
limited partnership have "complete control").
37. Compare REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 303 with id. § 403 (contrasting
powers and liabilities of general partners with those of limited partners).
38. See Barry S. Engel & Ronald L. Rudman, Family Limited Partnerships: New
Meaning for "Limited, " TR. & EST., July 1993, at 46, 47.
39. See, e.g., Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1333 (2003), affd
sub nom. Strangi v. Comm'r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the corporate
general partner had "sole, exclusive, and absolute right and authority" to control the
FLP).
40. See, e.g., id. (noting that the ninety-nine percent limited partnership interest
included no "authority or right to take part in the management" of the FLP).
41. See Updike, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that the federal gift tax exclusion "can be
used to gradually transfer ownership of the FLP to younger generation partners over
time"); Droubay, supra note 14, at 524 (noting that a traditional use of FLPs involves the
senior generation gifting limited partnership interests to their children).
42. Eric Thomas Carver, Probate Law: A Valuation Primer: Trends and Techniques
for Estate Planners, 77 MICH. BAR J. 1304, 1304 (1998).
43. See Easton, supra note 11, at 41.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Carver, supra note 42, at 1304.
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important because federal estate and gift taxes are based upon the
fair market value of the property transferred.47
Because of the lack of control48 and lack of marketability, 49 a
willing buyer would pay less for the limited partnership interests than
the underlying assets are actually worth.5" In other words, the value
of these interests may be discounted. 1 Consequently, if the limited
partnership interests are gifted during lifetime, the value of the gift
may be discounted for federal gift tax purposes to reflect the lack of
marketability and control. 2 Similarly, if the limited partnership
interests are retained by the senior generation until death, as the
sophisticated neighbor did in the introductory example, their value
may be discounted for federal estate tax purposes.53 It is the IRS's
assault on the availability of the discount for federal estate tax
purposes of retained limited partnership interests that is the subject of
this Comment.
Valuation of an interest in an FLP is determined using the
hypothetical "willing buyer-willing seller" test.54  This test is
articulated in the following way: "the fair market value is the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and
a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell
and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts."55
Again, the reason valuation is so important is that taxes are imposed
on the "transfer of property by gift ... by an individual"56 and on "the
transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent."57
47. See id.
48. Also known as minority discounts, the IRS has recognized that an interest in an
entity that does not represent a controlling interest may be worth less than the underlying
value of the assets composing that interest. See Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 203.
49. The lack of marketability discount refers to the fact that an interest in a closely-
held entity is worth less than the value of the underlying assets composing the interest
because the interest is not readily marketable or liquid. Updike, supra note 2, at 7-8.
50. Cf James R. Repetti, It's All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607,612-13 (2000)
(discussing a wealth tax and the problems annual valuations would cause for such a tax,
and suggesting that use of the willing buyer-willing seller valuation method would




54. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (2005). See generally D. John Thornton & Gregory A.
Byron, Valuation of Family Limited Partnership Interests, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 345 (1996)
(explaining principles of transfer tax valuation).
55. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (2005).
56. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2000); Thornton & Byron, supra note 54, at 346.
57. § 2001(a); Thornton & Byron, supra note 54, at 346. Because it is a direct tax on a
decedent's wealth, the estate tax has been attacked as an "unapportioned direct tax" in
violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution. To address
[Vol. 84
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Under the willing buyer-willing seller test, valuation discounts
for FLP interests are taken. First, FLP interests lack marketability; a
willing buyer would pay less than the full fair market value of the
underlying assets of the FLP.5 8 A limited partnership interest in an
FLP is less attractive than publicly traded stock, for example, because
the FLP interest, unlike the stock, is highly illiquid.59 Furthermore,
because limited partners may not participate at all in management
decisions, and the partnership agreements typically restrict the
limited partners' rights to transfer their interests and to withdraw
from the partnership, a buyer would pay even less for these
interests.6°
Substantial discounts have been allowed. 61 However, the use of
these discounts, and the burgeoning popularity of FLPs,62 caused the
IRS to take notice and to begin searching for law to support its
contention that the IRS was getting too little when it came time for
taxpayers to pay their gift and estate taxes.63 Scouring the Code for
alternatives, the IRS found little success before latching onto § 2036,
a provision it had previously conceded was inapplicable to FLPs.
6 4
These concessions, though coming in the form of non-precedential
Technical Advice Memoranda and Private Letter Rulings,65 suggest
that even the IRS once felt that § 2036 is not appropriate for
issues related to constitutionality, the estate tax has been framed "not as a property or
inheritance tax, but as a tax imposed upon the transfer of property." Thornton & Byron,
supra note 54, at 346-47 (discussing Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the United States
Constitution).
58. See Mandelbaum v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2852, 2863-64 (1995) (involving
valuation of stock in a closely-held family corporation), affd, 91 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 1996);
Moore v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1128, 1128-33 (1991) (involving valuation of interests
in an FLP of which the taxpayers made gifts to the "younger generation").
59. See Thornton & Byron, supra note 54, at 363.
60. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Comm'r, 283 F.3d 1258, 1267-68 (2003) (Ryskamp, J.,
dissenting) (outlining the willing buyer-willing seller test and arguing that restrictions
imposed by the partnership agreement in that case "would affect the price that a buyer
would be willing to pay" for certain assets).
61. See, e.g., Peracchio v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 412, 417-19 (2003) (allowing a
total discount of 31%, where the underlying assets were worth over $3 million); Lappo v.
Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 333, 339-40 (2000) (allowing a 15% discount for the lack of
control and a 24% discount for the lack of marketability for a total of a nearly 40%
discount).
62. See Rebecca B. Hawblitzel, Note, A Change in Planning: Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner's Effect on the Use of Family Limited Partnerships in Estate Planning, 57
ARK. L. REV. 595, 602-03 (2004); Novack, supra note 12, at 160.
63. See Hawblitzel, supra note 62, at 602; Janet Novack, Partners, but Not with the
IRS, FORBES, Apr. 17, 2000, at 450, 450.
64. See infra notes 124-26, 292-93 and accompanying text.
65. See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2000).
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regulating FLPs. The provision has not changed since the IRS
asserted it did not apply to FLPs; perhaps the IRS now uses § 2036
because it has gained some traction where other arguments have not
and not because it really is an appropriate way to deal with abuses of
FLPs.
II. EARLY, UNSUCCESSFUL IRS ATTEMPTS To STOP FLPs
Prior to its success under § 2036, the IRS advanced other
arguments for inclusion of the undiscounted, underlying FLP assets in
estates.66 Three such arguments were: (1) FLPs lack economic
substance; (2) the special valuation rules of chapter 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code67 should apply to FLPs; and (3) an immediate gift
upon formation of an FLP is made by reason of the diminution in
value resulting from the discount. With few exceptions,68 these
arguments have not been successful. 69  The IRS's approach to
targeting FLPs-by throwing multiple arguments at them until one,
§ 2036, resonated with courts-suggests that the IRS did not feel that
any Code provision specifically and adequately addressed the
problem of FLPs. As estate planners take note of the various courts'
pronouncements on the bona fide sale exception, they will begin
structuring FLPs that avoid application of § 2036 and the IRS will
once again be left to scour the Code for relief that it currently cannot
provide. Unless new legislation is passed, § 2036 may find its way to
the graveyard where other unsuccessful IRS arguments reside.
66. See Gagliardi, supra note 7, at 434-45 n.173 (detailing the IRS's attacks on FLPs,
particularly those attacks based on the special valuation rules of chapter 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code); Daniel H. Ruttenberg, The Tax Court's Execution of the Family Entity:
The Tax Court's Application of Internal Revenue Code Section 2036(a) to Family Entities,
80 N.D. L. REV. 41, 47-51 (2004) (summarizing the IRS's major arguments for inclusion of
FLP assets); Droubay, supra note 14, at 526-28; Courtney Lieb, Comment, The IRS Wages
War on the Family Limited Partnership: How to Establish a Family Limited Partnership
That Will Withstand Attack, 71 UMKC L. REv. 887, 894-906 (2003) (detailing IRS attacks
on FLPs and their efficacy).
67. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704.
68. See Shepherd v. Comm'r, 155 T.C. 376, 385-86 (2000), affd, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th
Cir. 2002); Gagliardi, supra note 7, at 440 (discussing the IRS's success in Shepherd in
arguing that "a gift occurs on the formation of the limited partnership").
69. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 47-51. Part of the reason that the IRS has been
unsuccessful may be that estate planners continued to set up FLPs for their clients,
meaning that there were more FLPs for the IRS's gift and estate tax auditors to deal with,
and fewer auditors to deal with the FLPs. See Novack, supra note 12, at 161 (noting that
in 1998, the IRS had 480 estate and gift tax auditors to deal with 45,000 taxable estates).
But the bigger problem for the IRS has been the "dubious" legal grounds for its attacks.
Id.
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All three of these arguments-that FLPs lack economic
substance, that the special valuation rules should apply, and that an
immediate gift on formation occurred-were advanced by the IRS in
Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner ("Strangi I"), the first of many
decisions regarding the estate of Albert Strangi, a Texas millionaire.7"
Just a few months before the elderly and ill decedent's death, his son-
in-law as attorney in fact set up an FLP with the decedent
contributing nearly $10 million in exchange for a ninety-nine percent
partnership interest.72 In addition to paying for the back surgery for
the decedent's home health care provider, the FLP also made
payments to the decedent's estate to pay federal estate taxes as well
as to provide gifts for the decedent's children.73 The FLP also
extended lines of credit to the Strangi children.74 Although the value
of the assets of the FLP was over $11 million at the time of the
decedent's death, the estate reported the discounted fair market value
of the decedent's interest in the FLP at about $6.5 million.75 The Tax
Court refused to accept the IRS's arguments for disregarding the FLP
and also noted its denial of the IRS's requested leave to amend its
petition to include an argument under § 2036.76 The denial of leave to
amend was ultimately overruled by the Fifth Circuit, so the IRS was
able to successfully advance the § 2036 argument against the Strangi
FLP.77
Strangi I provides an excellent illustration of the IRS's failed
arguments that FLPs lack economic substance, that the special
valuation rules of chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code should
apply to FLPs, and that a gift on formation of the FLP is made. Thus,
this Comment will recall these arguments using Strangi I as an
illustration.
70. 115 T.C. 478 (2000), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d
279 (5th Cir. 2002).
71. Strangi I was reversed in part and remanded by the Fifth Circuit in Gulig v.
Comm'r. See Gulig v. Comm'r (Strangi 11), 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002). Then, the
Tax Court ruled that the value of the assets transferred to an FLP and its corporate
general partner were includable in the decedent's gross estate under either § 2036(a)(1) or
§ 2036(a)(2). See Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi III), 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1337-
46 (2003). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding under § 2036(a)(1). See
Strangi v. Comm'r (Strangi IV), 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005).
72. Strangi I, 115 T.C. at 480-81.
73. Id. at 482-83.
74. Id. at 483.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 486-87.
77. Strangi H, 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002).
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A. Economic Substance Doctrine
The economic substance doctrine states that "transactions which
have no economic purpose or substance other than the avoidance of
taxes will be disregarded."78 In Strangi I, the IRS argued that Albert
Strangi's FLP "lacked economic substance"7 9 and "should be
disregarded in valuing the assets in decedent's estate.""8° The Tax
Court conceded that the Strangi FLP's alleged business purposes
were flimsy and difficult to believe,8' but, "[r]egardless of subjective
intentions, the partnership had sufficient substance to be recognized
for tax purposes. "82 A buyer of the decedent's assets would certainly
not disregard the FLP's existence, the Tax Court noted.83 Thus, the
willing buyer-willing seller test makes it unlikely that the economic
substance doctrine will result in a court disregarding any FLP that is
validly formed under state law.' Indeed, the Tax Court has
continued to hold that it will not disregard FLPs for lack of economic
substance where they meet state partnership law requirements.85
B. Special Valuation Rules of Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue
Code
Next, the IRS has challenged FLPs under § 2703(a)86 and
§ 2704(b),87 the special valuation rules of chapter 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Both sections curb the abuses of provisions in
partnership agreements restricting partners' rights, whose purposes
are "to lower the value of the partnership interests."88  Section
78. Strangi 1, 115 T.C. at 484 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70
(1935); Merryman v. Comm'r, 873 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1989)).
79. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 48.
80. Strangi 1, 115 T.C. at 484.
81. Id. at 485.
82. Id. at 486-87.
83. Id. at 487.
84. See id. at 486-87 (declining to disregard an FLP where the partnership complied
with formalities and was sufficiently substantive); see also Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r,
84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 385 (2002), aff'd, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that the
Thompson FLPs had sufficient substance to be recognized for federal estate and gift tax
purposes where they were validly formed under state law); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C.
506, 514 (2000) (refusing to disregard an FLP formed validly under state law where "[there
is] no reason to conclude.., that a hypothetical buyer or seller would disregard it").
85. See Thompson, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) at 385; Knight, 115 T.C. at 514.
86. I.R.C. § 2703(a) (2000).
87. Id. § 2704(b).
88. Lieb, supra note 66, at 901; see also John A. Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine,
Fundamentals of Estate Tax Planning, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 197, 231-32 (1996) (summarizing
the special valuation rules, including the rules regarding when restrictions relating to the
property will be disregarded for valuation purposes).
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2703(a)(2) states that the value of transferred property is to be
determined without regard to restrictions on the rights to sell or use
the property except in certain situations.89 In Strangi I, the Tax Court
rejected the IRS's contention that the "property" transferred was the
underlying partnership assets and not just the decedent's discounted
partnership interest." Section 2704(b) states that "applicable
restriction[s]" should be disregarded in valuing the transferred
interest in the FLP to a family member of the transferor.9 1 An
applicable restriction is defined as a restriction on the ability to
liquidate the FLP that is more restrictive than state law.' The IRS
has consistently lost in its attempts to disregard restrictions in valuing
FLP assets, with the courts holding that the FLP agreements were no
more restrictive than state law or that FLP agreement restrictions are
not "applicable restrictions."93
C. Gift on Formation
Finally, the IRS has argued that "the decedent ... made a
taxable gift upon the creation of the [FLP]."94 The taxable gift would
be valued at the "fair market value of the assets transferred to the
partnership ... less the fair market value of the partnership ...
interest" that the decedent received upon contributing his assets.95
The idea is that the decedent made a taxable gift to the other partners
of the difference between the value of the underlying assets and the
value of the partnership interests.96 Here, the IRS has had limited
success. In Shepherd v. Commissioner,97 the Tax Court held that if a
partner contributes assets to an FLP, which are then allocated to that
partner's account as well as to other noncontributing partners'
89. § 2703(a)(2); id. § 2703(b)(1)-(3).
90. Strangi 1, 115 T.C. 478, 488-89 (2000), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Strangi
If, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
91. § 2704(b)(1).
92. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-(2)(b) (2005).
93. See, e.g., Kerr v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
restrictions at issue are not "applicable restrictions"); Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C.
121, 130 (2001) (holding that the FLP restrictions were no more restrictive than state law);
Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506,519-20 (2000) (same).
94. See Lieb, supra note 66, at 896-98; see also Porter, supra note 14, at 49 (noting that
the IRS has argued that a "gift on formation" is the result of FLP formation).
95. See Lieb, supra note 66, at 896 (quoting Dennis I. Belcher & David T. Lewis, Gift
on Creation: The IRS Attacks Family Limited Partnerships, 13 PROB. & PROP. 13, 13-14
(1999)); see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-42-003 (July 2, 1998) (in which the IRS argued
the "gift on formation" theory for the first time).
96. See Porter, supra note 14, at 49; Lieb, supra note 66, at 896.
97. 115 T.C. 376 (2000), affd 283 F.3d 1258 (llth Cir. 2002).
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accounts, the transfers to the partnership are gifts to the
noncontributing partners.98 However, in spite of this holding, in
Strangi I the Tax Court declined to apply the gift on formation
theory, noting: "[T]he disparity between the value of the assets in the
hands of decedent and the alleged value of his partnership interest
reflects on the credibility of the claimed discount .... It does not
reflect a taxable gift."9 9 The Tax Court also distinguished Shepherd,
because in that case the transferring partner's contributions to the
FLP were allocated to the noncontributing partners' capital
accounts.'0° The transfer of Strangi's assets to the FLP were all
credited to the decedent's capital account; thus, it is difficult to argue
that the decedent made a gift to the noncontributing partners. 10 1
While the above arguments have proven largely unsuccessful for
the IRS, °2 in the past few years it has searched its arsenal and found a
new weapon in § 2036. The Tax Court has been willing to include an
FLP's underlying assets in a decedent's estate, thereby ignoring
claimed valuation discounts. 3 When this occurs, "the assets the
98. Id. at 389.
99. Strangi 1, 115 T.C. 478, 490 (2000), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Strangi 11,
293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
100. See id. at 490 (citing Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 389).
101. Id. The Tax Court in Strangi I also cites Kincaid v. United States, an "analogous"
case in which a taxpayer donated land to a family corporation in exchange for stock and in
which the court held that she had made a gift of the difference in the value of the land and
the stock. See id. at 484-90 (citing Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220, 1226 (5th Cir.
1982)). However, the court distinguishes Kincaid, because in that case it appeared that the
other shareholders in the family corporation's interests in the land were greatly enhanced.
See Kincaid, 682 F.2d at 1224. In Strangi I, by contrast, the decedent maintained an
interest in the transferred assets, and the other partners (his children) did not receive an
interest in those assets until his death. Strangi 1, 115 T.C. at 490.
102. See Strangi 1, 115 T.C. at 486-87, 488-89, 489-90 (rejecting all three discussed
arguments); see also Kerr v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to
disregard restrictions in valuing the FLP assets); Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 84
T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 385 (2002), aff'd 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument
that the decedent's FLP lacked economic substance); Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C.
121, 130 (2001) (refusing to disregard restrictions in valuing the FLP assets and likening
the result to that reached in Kerr); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 514 (2000) (rejecting
both the economic substance and special valuation rule arguments); Church v. United
States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 60,369, at 84,778, 84,780-81 (T.C. 2000) (holding no
gift on formation was made where each partner contributed to the FLP), affd, 268 F.3d
1063 (5th Cir. 2001). But see Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 389 (holding an indirect gift on
formation was made where the assets contributed to an FLP are credited not only to the
transferring partner's capital account but also to the noncontributing partners' accounts).
103. See, e.g., Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1652 (2002)
(illustrating the Tax Court's willingness to include an FLP's underlying assets in a
decedent's estate and thereby ignoring claimed valuation discounts); Thompson, 84
T.C.M. (CCH) at 387 (same); Estate of Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 158 (2000)
(same); Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2858 (1997) (same).
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donor-decedent contributed to the [FLP] are included in his gross
estate for estate tax purposes, including those representing assets that
were previously gifted away.' In the next Part of this Comment,
the legislative history, purpose, early interpretations, and Tax Court
applications of § 2036(a) will be discussed. This discussion reveals
that despite evidence that § 2036 should not apply to FLPs-and
reliance on this evidence by estate planners-§ 2036 has proven to be
the IRS's most successful weapon yet against FLPs.
III. THE IRS FINDS WAYS To WIN WITH SECTION 2036
A. Legislative History
Section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code, governing transfers
with retained life estate, provides in part:
(a) General rule. The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
... ), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his
life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death...-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom.
(b) Voting rights.
(1) In general. For purposes of subsection (a)(1), the retention
of the right to vote (directly or indirectly) shares of stock of a
controlled corporation shall be considered to be a retention of
the enjoyment of transferred property .... "I
In order for § 2036(a)(1) to apply to a lifetime transfer, such as
the transfer of assets to an FLP, two conditions must be met: (1) the
transfer must not be a "bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth" and (2) the decedent-
104. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 51.
105. I.R.C. § 2036(a)-(b) (2000).
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transferor must have retained "the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property. 1 16 By using § 2036 to attack
the bona fides of the creation of an FLP, the IRS seeks to bring the
undiscounted, underlying assets of an FLP back into the transferor's
estate.0 7 Thus, in applying § 2036, the IRS attempts to restore
substance over form and to treat the two neighbors discussed in the
Introduction to this Comment in identical fashion.
To understand § 2036, it is helpful to examine the legislative
history of the provision and its purpose. The purpose of § 2036's
predecessors"" was to prevent estate tax avoidance by those who
transferred their property before death but retained a life estate in
that property.10 9 In the case where a donor-decedent did this, "the
value of the entire asset, not just the life estate, was included in a
donor-decedent's gross estate."11  However, a flurry of Supreme
Court per curiam opinions in 1931 stating unambiguously that
remainder interests would avoid estate taxation under the precursor
of § 2036, § 302(c),"' caused Congress to quickly amend § 302(c) to
substantially its current version in § 2036.112
B. The Genesis of FLPs
The Supreme Court's last look at § 2036 came in 1972, in United
States v. Byrum.113  In that case, the decedent, Byrum, transferred
stock from three corporations he controlled into an irrevocable trust
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Strangi IV, 417 F.3d 468, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2005); Estate of Thompson v.
Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 372-81 (3d Cir. 2004); Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 260
(5th Cir. 2004).
108. See Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 746, 777-78
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2036 (2000)), amended by Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L.
No. 69-20, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 9, 70. Section 302(c), as amended, was re-codified as
§ 811(c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Then it was re-codified as § 2036(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. For a detailed history of § 2036, see Ruttenberg,
supra note 66, at 51-55.
109. See Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297, 298 (1938).
110. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 52.
111. See McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784, 784 (1931) (per curiam); Morsman v.
Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 783-84 (1931) (per curiam); Burnet v. N. Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 783
(1931) (per curiam). Under § 302(c) remainder interests were not made part of the donor-
decedent's gross estate for taxation purposes because, although the statute was clear that a
retained life estate in an asset constituted "possession and enjoyment" of an asset, it was
not clear that a remainder interest did so. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 52-53.
112. The same day that McCormick, Morsman, and North Trust Co. were handed
down, both houses of Congress unanimously passed an amendment to § 302(c), which the
President also signed that day. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169;
Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 54-55.
113. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
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for the benefit of Byrum's children and with a bank as trustee. 14
Byrum retained the right, however: (1) to vote the shares of stock
transferred to the trust; (2) to object to the transfer or sale of any
trust assets; (3) to approve investments; and (4) to discharge the
trustee and select another.115 The IRS sought to have the value of the
stock transferred included in the value of Byrum's estate on the
grounds that he had retained the right to designate who enjoyed the
income from the property pursuant to § 2036(a)(2)." 6 The Supreme
Court held in favor of the estate,'17 in part because Byrum's fiduciary
duty to the corporations and their other shareholders limited his right
to designate who possessed or enjoyed the income from the stock
under § 2036(a)(2)." 8 Unhappy with the result in Byrum," 9 Congress
amended § 2036 and added subsection (b), which expressly states that
the retention of the right to vote shares of stock in a controlled
corporation will be considered retention of the enjoyment of such
property.20
But even though Congress overruled Byrum by statute, § 2036(b)
by its terms does not apply to noncorporate entities such as FLPs. So
after Byrum, estate planners began widely using FLPs for their
clients, relying on the fiduciary duty idea in Byrum to "keep the
FLP's underlying assets out of their [clients'] gross estates.' '121 They
reasoned that the general partner of an FLP owes a fiduciary duty to
the FLP and its limited partners that is similar to the fiduciary duty
owed to the corporation and its shareholders by the corporate
directors.2  This fiduciary duty limited the general partners' power to
control the FLP and, therefore, "was not a legal right to designate
114. Id. at 126.
115. See id. at 126-27; Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 57.
116. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 131-32.
117. Id. at 136-37.
118. Id. at 142.
119. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380 at 65, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3419.
120. I.R.C. § 2036(b) (2000). Compare the Byrum situation with one in which parents
control a corporation and retain only voting common shares, giving away nonvoting
common shares. The parents have not retained the right to vote under § 2036(b) because
the shares given away never had voting rights. See I.R.S. Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422, at
428-39. Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code (special valuation rules) also exempts
this type of situation from its reach. See S. REP. No. 95-745 at 82-85 (1978); I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 1999-38-005 (June 7, 1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-04-017 (Oct. 27, 1989). See
generally 5 BORIS I. BI-ITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 126.6.5 (2d ed. 1989) ("[I1f the decedent transferred voting and
nonvoting stock, reserving the right to vote, only the voting stock is included under
§2036(b).").
121. See Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 59-60.
122. See id. at 59-60 & n.117.
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under section 2036(a)(2).' '123 The IRS also approved these
transactions in fifteen years' worth of Private Letter Rulings and
Technical Advice Memoranda,2 which, though lacking precedential
value,12 5 created reliance among estate planners. 26
C. Early Tax Court Opinions on Section 2036 in the FLP Context
However, this reliance may have been misplaced, as the Tax
Court127 has become more and more willing to apply § 2036 to
FLPs.128 The first time a court held that an FLP's assets fell within
§ 2036(a)(1) was in 1997, when the Tax Court issued a Memorandum
Opinion in Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner.29 In that case,
the decedent, Schauerhamer, had established three FLPs130 but during
her lifetime she disregarded them and did not respect their existence,
making the Tax Court's decision much easier. For example,
123. See id. at 60.
124. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Aug. 2, 1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-
021 (Mar. 7, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Apr. 15, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-
10-039 (Mar. 12,1993); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-004 (Nov. 15, 1985).
125. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2000).
126. See Mario A. Mata, Use of FLPs and LLCs in Asset Protection Planning, PRAC.
TAX LAW., Winter 2004, at 15, 15-30. Interestingly, the IRS once acknowledged that the
fiduciary duties of the general partner of an FLP were a sufficient restraint on the general
partner so as to "preclude inclusion of the transferred interests in the general partner
transferor's gross estate." See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Jan. 12, 1994); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (Dec. 16, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-006 (Aug. 20, 1992); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-31-006 (Apr. 30, 1991); Gagliardi, supra note 7, at 435 n.175.
127. The United States Tax Court is an administrative court established by Congress
under Article I of the Constitution. See United States Tax Court, About the Court,
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2005). Nineteen presidentially
appointed judges serving fifteen-year terms make up the Tax Court. See Stephen C. Gara,
Challenging the Finality of Tax Court Judgments: When Is Final Not Really Final?, 20
AKRON TAX J. 35, 39-40 (2005). In addition to those judges, senior judges sitting by
designation and special trial judges conduct trials. See United States Tax Court, About the
Court, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2005). A taxpayer may
petition the Tax Court within ninety days of a deficiency notice from the IRS; after ninety
days have passed, the Tax Court loses jurisdiction. I.R.C. § 6213(a), (c). The taxpayer
must then pay the tax and then sue in the United States Claims Court or in a district court
for a refund. See David P. Korteling, Comment, Let Me Tell You How It Will Be: Here's
One for You, Nineteen for Me: Modifying the Internal Revenue Service's Approach to
Resolving Tax Disputes, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 659, 666 & n.41-42 (1993). Thus, one
reason the Tax Court is an attractive forum for litigating tax disputes is that the taxpayer
does not have to pay the disputed amount before receiving a judgment. See Gara, supra,
at 35. Appeals from the Tax Court are to the United States Court of Appeals for the
circuit in which the taxpayer resides. I.R.C. § 7482.
128. See Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 67-90 (discussing several Tax Court holdings
applying § 2036(a)(1) to FLPs).
129. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2858 (1997).
130. Id. at 2856.
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Schauerhamer commingled partnership and nonpartnership funds in
her personal bank account, she paid her personal and partnership
expenses from this bank account, and she maintained no records to
account for the separate funds. 3' In holding that § 2036(a)(1)
applied, the Tax Court found that the partners had an implied
agreement that Schauerhamer would retain the economic benefits of
the transferred property for her life.
13 2
This implied agreement theory was also important to the Tax
Court in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner,3 3 in which a widower
formed an FLP with his two children and transferred substantially all
of his property to that FLP.'34 As was the case in Schauerhamer, the
decedent in Reichardt commingled personal and partnership funds
and retained control of investments. 135  Furthermore, Reichardt
transferred his personal residence to the FLP but never paid the FLP
rent for the use of such residence thereafter.'36 The Tax Court held
that § 2036(a)(1) was applicable to all the property Reichardt
transferred to the FLP.'37 The court reasoned that the only real
change to the property Reichardt transferred to the FLP was a
change in legal title and that Reichardt and his children had an
implied agreement that for Reichardt's lifetime he would retain the
economic benefits from the transferred property. 138
The Tax Court again applied the implied agreement theory in
Estate of Harper v. Commissioner.3 9 In that case, the decedent
contributed the majority of his assets to an FLP, of which his two
children were general partners and a revocable trust was the limited
partner.' 4 However, the general partners could not act on a number
of issues without written consent from the limited partner trust, of
which the decedent was the trustee and primary beneficiary. 4' This
arrangement, coupled with the same commingling of funds that
occurred in Schauerhamer and Reichardt, led the Tax Court to find
there was an implied agreement between Harper and his children that
131. Id. at 2857.
132. Id.
133. 114 T.C. 144 (2000).
134. Id. at 147-48.
135. Id. at 148-49.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 158.
138. See id. at 152-55; see also Droubay, supra note 14, at 534 (discussing the holding in
Reichardt).
139. 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1650 (2002).
140. Id. at 1642.
141. Id. at 1642-43.
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Harper would retain the economic benefits of the property he
transferred to the FLP.142 Thus, § 2036(a)(1) operated to include the
value of the transferred property in the decedent's gross estate.
1 43
Also in Harper, the Tax Court introduced its "recycling of value"
theory by which it has continued to apply § 2036(a)(1) to FLP
assets.1" Under the recycling theory, a transaction is not "bona fide"
and, thus, is not excepted from § 2036(a)(1)'s reach145 if the taxpayer
acts as both transferor and controlling partner of the transferee
entity.1 46 The Tax Court found that the decedent in Harper had
merely "change[d] the form in which he held his beneficial interest in
the contributed property.1 47 In other words, the Tax Court found
that he had just "recycled" it.
148
However, there were still some instances when the Tax Court
refused to apply § 2036(a)(1) to an estate. Retention of enjoyment of
the transferred property proved to be the downfall of the estates of
Schauerhamer, Reichardt, and Harper. But § 2036(a) also includes a
parenthetical exception "to the general rule of inclusion in a
decedent's gross estate under subsections 2036(a)(1) or (2).149
Basically, a transfer falling within subsections 2036(a)(1) or (2) "does
not cause inclusion in the decedent's gross estate" 5 if it is a "bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth."'51 In Harper, the Tax Court stated that the two requirements
for exception were: "(1) [a] bona fide sale ... and (2) adequate and
full consideration."' 52 Such requirements were met in Estate of Stone
v. Commissioner,'53 wherein a husband and wife set up five FLPs for
their children just seven months before the husband's death and two
years before the wife's. 54 The Tax Court distinguished Stone from
Schauerhamer, Reichardt, and Harper because the Stone
"partnerships were created as a result of arm's-length negotiations, in
142. Id. at 1649-50.
143. Id. at 1649.
144. Id. at 1653.
145. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000) (excepting a "bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration").
146. Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A Critical Analysis and
Planning Suggestions, 100 TAX NOTES 1153, 1163 (2003).
147. Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1653.
148. Id.
149. See Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 93.
150. Id. at 94.
151. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
152. Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1653.
153. 86 T.C.M. 551 (2003).
154. Id. at 552, 560; see also Easton, supra note 11, at 36-37 (summarizing Stone).
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which each family member was represented by independent counsel"
and were "motivated by investment and business concerns. "155
These early Tax Court cases not only gave practitioners
illustrations of bad facts to avoid regarding the formation and
operation of FLPs but also illustrated the importance of the bona fide
sale exception. 11 6 Before the circuit courts had weighed in on the
meaning of the exception, the Tax Court seemed to require evidence
of "(1) legitimate negotiations during formation of the FLP, and (2)
with respect to funding and operation, something more than a mere
recycling of value." '157 To avoid recycling, there must be a "legitimate
pooling of assets and/or the presence of a legitimate business.
1 58
D. Qualifying for the Bona Fide Sale Exception to Section 2036
After these early Tax Court decisions, one goal for estate
planners using FLPs was to qualify for the bona fide sale exception.159
The meaning of that exception is currently unclear, however, as
evidenced by the conflict in recent decisions by the Fifth and Third
Circuits. These decisions are discussed in Part IV of this Comment.
There are, however, certain guidelines that commentators and
practitioners agree should be followed in structuring an FLP today.6
An FLP should be operated "in a businesslike and formal manner,
with real transactions for real purposes, other than mere tax
savings."'61 The decedent should avoid the commingling of funds that
the Tax Court relied on in Schauerhamer, Reichardt, and Harper as
evidence of retaining enjoyment by transferring contributed property
immediately to the partnership and keeping partnership and personal
accounts separate. 62  The other partners should participate in the
formation of the FLP to the extent possible so as to avoid the
implication that the FLP's formation was simply an alternate method
of ensuring that the decedent's testamentary wishes were carried
155. Easton, supra note 11, at 37.
156. See Korpics, supra note 29, at 111-12.
157. See id. at 112 (citing Harper and Stone, as well as the Tax Court dispositions of
Thompson and Strangi).
158. See id.
159. Lance S. Hall, Estate of Stone Brings Sanity to §2036, VALUATION TODAY
ARCHIVE, Feb. 7, 2003, http://www.fmv.com/data/ValuationToday-Archive_11_7_03.php
?x=l.
160. See Louis S. Harrison & Charles F. "Monty" Newlin, New Golden Rule for
Partnerships, TR. & EST., Oct. 2004, at 20, 23.
161. Id.
162. See Bissonnette, supra note 3, at 77; Lieb, supra note 66, at 910.
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out.'6 3 The decedent should also retain sufficient assets to support
himself rather than transferring substantially all of his assets to the
FLP.16  Finally, if the decedent continues to possess partnership
assets, he should pay the partnership for their use. 65
Further evidence that § 2036 is inappropriate for application to
FLPs lies in the fact that President Bill Clinton's administration tried
several times to motivate Congress to pass a statute expressly dealing
with FLPs.16 If the Clinton administration had felt that an existing
provision of the Internal Revenue Code effectively dealt with FLPs, it
would not have been logical for the Administration to seek
legislation.
167
IV. UNCERTAINTY AMONG THE CIRCUITS AND THE TAX COURT
While it is clear that the bona fide sale exception still exists in the
context of § 2036(a), 68 courts are defining what constitutes "a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth''169 in different terms, causing confusion among practitioners
and commentators.17 ° The Fifth and Third Circuits seem to disagree
on whether a decedent who has received proportionate interests in an
FLP for her contributions to the FLP has received full and adequate
163. See Bissonnette, supra note 3, at 77; Updike, supra note 2, at 38; Lieb, supra note
66, at 910.
164. See Bissonnette, supra note 3, at 78; Lieb, supra note 66, at 910.
165. See Bissonnette, supra note 3, at 78 (noting that a downside to such an
arrangement is that it results in taxable income for the partnership, with the result being
"that the client will be taxed on the income resulting from the rent he has paid"); Lieb,
supra note 66, at 910.
166. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 167 (1999); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 291-93 (Comm. Print 1999).
167. See Christopher P. Bray, Was Strangi II a Setup?, PLANNED GIVING DESIGN
CENTER, Feb. 10, 2004, http://www.pgdc.com/usa/item/?itemlD=106229#fn22. Bray's
references to Strangi H refer to Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331
(2003), which this Comment refers to as Strangi III. See supra note 71.
168. See Estate of Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. 551, 578 (2003).
169. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
170. See Korpics, supra note 20, at 34-35 (discussing pre-Bongard and post-Bongard
approaches to the bona fide sale exception); Korpics, supra note 29, at 112-13 (discussing
the differences between the Tax Court's, the Third Circuit's, and the Fifth Circuit's
approaches to recognizing the bona fide sale exception). Compare Estate of Thompson v.
Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 381 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding where the partnership interests do not
have the same value as the transferred assets that heightened scrutiny of whether full and
adequate consideration has been paid is triggered), with Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d
257, 266 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding decedent's receipt of proportionate interests in the FLP
meant she had received full and adequate consideration).
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consideration. 7' Furthermore, both circuits and the Tax Court use
different language to define the bona fide sale exception, causing
confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency. 72
The battle over FLPs came to a head in the fall of 2004 when the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided in Estate of Thompson
v. Commissioner13 that § 2036(a)(1) applied to a transfer by a ninety-
five year old decedent of about $2.8 million to two FLPs. 174 Applying
§ 2036(a)(1), the Third Circuit determined that no "bona fide sale for
adequate and full consideration ' 175 took place, in part because the
reduction in value that occurs when assets are contributed to a
partnership (i.e., the difference between the value of the underlying
property transferred to the partnership and the value of the
partnership interests received) reduces the possibility of full and
adequate consideration being paid.176 This appears to conflict with
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision on this issue.
Just a few months before Thompson was decided, the Fifth
Circuit in Kimbell v. United States17  held that § 2036(a)(1) did not
apply where a ninety-six year old woman transferred nearly all of her
assets to an FLP and died within two months of its creation, and her
executor claimed that her ninety-nine percent limited partnership
interest should be discounted by nearly half.171 There, the Fifth
171. While the Fifth Circuit found that the decedent's receipt of proportionate interests
in the FLP meant she had received full and adequate consideration, the Third Circuit
stated that full and adequate consideration does not exist unless the partnership interests
had the same value as the transferred assets. Compare Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381, with
Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 266. The Thompson concurrence more explicitly disagreed with
Kimbell, quoting the Fifth Circuit and suggesting that the Kimbell court "does not take
into account that ... the property transferred must be 'replaced by property of equal value
that could be exposed to inclusion in the decedent's gross estate.' " Thompson, 382 F.3d
at 387 n.24 (Greenberg, J., concurring) (quoting Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Comm'r, 101
F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 1996)).
172. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 378-79, 383 (discussing the idea that there is no
consideration where there is a "mere recycling of value" and that a bona fide sale requires
"good faith"); Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 265-67 (suggesting that a sale between family members
can be bona fide if it is not a "sham transaction" and that objective facts such as donors
receiving proportionate interests in the partnership based on assets contributed inform the
consideration question); Estate of Bongard v. Comm'r, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA)
124.8, at 124-54, 124-68 (T.C. Mar. 15, 2005) (defining the requirements for a bona fide
sale as "a legitimate and significant nontax reason for creating the [FLP]" and
"partnership interests proportionate to the value of the property transferred").
173. 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004).
174. Id. at 369.
175. Where there is a bona fide sale, the transfer is excepted from § 2036's reach. See
I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2000).
176. Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381.
177. 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004).
178. Id. at 259-60.
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Circuit said that there is full and adequate consideration if each
partner receives partnership interests in proportion to the value of the
property that partner contributed.179 The Thompson court rejected
this idea unless the transaction was a commercial one, that is, that the
primary purpose of the partnership arrangement was a business,
nontax purpose. 8  The estates in both cases presented similar
"ugliness,"18' but the courts reached different results, applying
§ 2036(a)(1) to return the FLP's assets to the estate in Thompson
18 2
but refusing to do so in Kimbell where the court found full and
adequate consideration. 83
In the summer of 2005, the Fifth Circuit weighed in on the FLP
debate again in Strangi v. Commissioner ("Strangi IV"),"8 affirming
the Tax Court's conclusion that § 2036(a) requires a decedent's estate
to include assets transferred by him during his life to an FLP 1 5 After
first rejecting the estate's argument that the decedent did not
maintain "possession or enjoyment" of the property he transferred to
the FLP, the Fifth Circuit conceded that the decedent received
"adequate and full consideration" because he received proportional
interests in the FLP in exchange for the assets transferred. 86
However, because the Tax Court rejected each of the estate's
proffered nontax purposes for the transfers and these rejections were
not clearly erroneous, the sale was not bona fide. 87 Under the Third
Circuit's reasoning, it is not clear even that "adequate and full
consideration" would be found in Strangi IV
88
Further adding to the uncertainty about § 2036(a)(1)'s
application to FLPs, the full Tax Court in Estate of Bongard v.
Commissioner'89 determined that the "bona fide sale for adequate
and full consideration exception is met" where there is a "legitimate
and significant non-tax reason" for the FLP's creation and where the
"transferors received partnership interests proportionate to the value
179. Id. at 262.
180. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 383; see also Harrison & Newlin, supra note 160, at 32
(describing the different interpretations of the Third and Fifth Circuits).
181. Harrison & Newlin, supra note 160, at 20 (referring to the bad facts in both cases).
182. Thompson, 382 F.3d at 369.
183. Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 262.
184. 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005).
185. Id. at 472.
186. Id. at 478-79.
187. Id. at 481-82.
188. See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 387 (3d Cir. 2004).
189. 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 1 124.8, at 124-54 (T.C. Mar. 15, 2005).
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of the property transferred."'9 ° However, the Tax Court in Bongard
also determined the nontax reasons for forming the FLP were not
legitimate or significant enough on the facts of that case.'91
After Kimbell, Thompson, Bongard, and Strangi IV, it is, of
course, still possible to form an FLP that would withstand scrutiny by
the IRS or a court.192 However, uncertainty reigns at the margins.'93
In the Sections that follow, these cases will be discussed in further
depth to illuminate the uncertainty and inconsistency regarding the
bona fide sale exception to § 2036 and underscore the need for
corrective legislation.
A. Kimbell
Ruth Kimbell died at age ninety-six.9 4 Two months before her
death, an FLP was created by two entities: (1) a trust of which
Kimbell and her son were co-trustees; and (2) a limited liability
corporation ("LLC") owned by the trust and by Kimbell's son and
daughter-in-law.'95 The LLC contributed one percent of the FLP's
assets and was the FLP's general partner, while the trust contributed
ninety-nine percent of the FLP's assets and was the FLP's only
limited partner. 96 When the IRS audited Kimbell's estate tax return,
it found the value of her limited partnership interest to be $2.4
million, double the $1.2 million the estate reported. 97
Kimbell's son paid the extra tax and then sued for a refund in
federal district court in Texas.198 When addressing the bona fide sale
exception, the district court relied on Harper for the proposition that
two requirements must be met for that exception to apply: "(1) a
bona fide sale, meaning an arm's length transaction, and (2) adequate
and full consideration."' 99 The district court found that neither
190. Id. at 124-68. The Tax Court further went on to discuss certain nontax reasons
that might satisfy the bona fide sale exception: investment management, creditor
protection, and pooling of assets. See id.
191. Id. at 124-73.
192. See Korpics, supra note 29, at 111; see also Estate of Schutt v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1353, 1367-68 (2005) (determining that the decedent's transfer of assets to two
family entities were bona fide sales because there existed a "legitimate and significant
non-tax reason"--perpetuation of a long-standing investment philosophy-for the
transfer).
193. See supra note 31.
194. Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2004).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 260.
198. See Easton, supra note 11, at 38.
199. Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 261.
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requirement was met in Kimbell. First, because family members were
on both sides of the transaction, the district court held that "the
transfer was not at arm's length."2' Also, if the transfer of assets to
the FLP was a bona fide sale, the pro rata interest that Kimbell
received in the FLP (a ninety-nine percent interest for ninety-nine
percent asset contribution) was not adequate consideration. 1
The Fifth Circuit reversed."a The court laid out the following
principles:
[W]hat is required for the transfer by Mrs. Kimbell to the
Partnership to qualify as a bona fide sale is that it be a sale in
which the decedent/transferor actually parted with her interest
in the assets transferred and the partnership/transferee actually
parted with the partnership interest issued in exchange. In
order for the sale to be adequate and full consideration, the
exchange of assets for partnership interests must be roughly
equivalent so the transfer does not deplete the estate. In
addition when the transaction is between family members, it is
subject to heightened scrutiny to insure that the sale is not a
sham transaction or a disguised gift. The scrutiny is limited to
the examination of objective facts that would confirm or deny
the taxpayer's assertion that the transaction is bona fide or
genuine.203
In determining that adequate and full consideration was received
by Kimbell in this case, the court focused on:
(1) whether the interest credited to each of the partners was
proportionate to the fair market value of the assets each
partner contributed to the partnership, (2) whether the assets
contributed by each partner to the partnership were properly
credited to the respective capital accounts of the partners, and
(3) whether on termination or dissolution of the partnership the
partners were entitled to distributions from the partnership in
amounts equal to their respective capital accounts. The answer
to each of these questions in this case is yes.2°
The Fifth Circuit went on to list several facts it found important
in determining that Kimbell's transfer to the FLP was a bona fide
sale.2°5  These included the facts that Kimbell did not commingle
200. Id. at 262.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 269.
203. Id. at 265.
204. Id. at 266 (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 267.
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personal and FLP assets and maintained sufficient assets outside the
FLP for her support, that "[FLP] formalities were satisfied," that
among the assets contributed to the FLP were working oil and gas
interests, and that "several credible and unchallenged non-tax
business reasons" existed for the formation of the FLP. °6 Thus, the
court determined that adequate and full consideration could be found
where a partner receives an interest in the FLP proportionate to the
value of her contribution to the FLP, even though the fair market
value of the FLP interest is lower than the fair market value of the
contributed property.2°7 This is so, the court reasoned, because
deciding to exchange marketable assets for a "transfer-restricted,
non-managerial interest in a limited partnership" is a business
decision that involves "financial considerations other than the
purchaser's ability to turn right around and sell. '' 208  Some of the
benefits sought by investors in these types of transactions include
"management expertise, security and preservation of assets, capital
appreciation and avoidance of personal liability. 2 9 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit determined that it was not inconsistent to acknowledge "that
the investor[] ... ha[s] acquired a[n] . .. interest at arm's length for
adequate and full consideration and ... that the asset thus acquired
has a present fair market value ... of substantially less than the
dollars just paid-a classic informed trade-off.
210
B. Thompson
Four months later, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of what could constitute full and adequate
consideration.2 In Thompson, Theodore Thompson formed two
FLPs-one for each of his children-two years before his death at age
ninety-seven. 212 Thompson owned forty-nine percent of the minority
corporate general partners of each FLP.213 Thompson contributed
just over $1.4 million to each FLP, retaining only about $153,000 in
206. Id.




211. See generally Harrison & Newlin, supra note 160 (comparing the competing
interpretations of the "full and adequate consideration exception to 2036").
212. Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 370 (3d. Cir. 2004).
213. Id. The corporate general partners maintained only a one percent interest in each
FLP, so Theodore Thompson owned forty-nine percent of the one percent general
partners. Id.
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personal assets." 4 His daughter contributed real estate interests to
her FLP, and his son contributed some real estate interests and his
interest in a mutual fund to his FLP.21 5 On Thompson's estate tax
return, the estate discounted the value of his interests in the two FLPs
by forty percent.216
The Tax Court disallowed the discount under § 2036.217 Facts
important to the Tax Court's decision included: (1) evidence in the
form of a letter from Thompson's financial advisor indicating that an
FLP could be used to reduce taxes; (2) that the FLPs made
distributions to Thompson to fund annual Christmas gifts; (3) that the
daughter's FLP lent money to her children and grandchildren, which
Thompson had done previously; (4) that the children retained income
from property they contributed to their FLPs; and (5) that the assets
of the FLPs were used to pay some of Thompson's bequests after his
death as well as his estate taxes.218
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court. t9 In doing
so, it concluded that the bona fide sale exception did not apply to the
transfers of Thompson's property to the FLPs.22° Because it found
that the transactions "were not motivated by ... legitimate business
concerns," the court said that the FLPs served only as "a vehicle for
changing the form in which the decedent held his property-a mere
'recycling of value.' "221
The Third Circuit distinguished Kimbell. First, in Thompson,
"predominantly marketable securities" were transferred to the FLPs,
which then engaged in little or no investment activities. 2
Parenthetically, the court indicated that in Kimbell, the bona fide sale
exception was applied to "working oil and gas interests transferred to
[an FLP] to provide, among other things, centralized management
214. Id.
215. Id. at 370-72.
216. See id. at 369.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 386-88; see also Easton, supra note 11, at 40 (summarizing the facts of
Thompson).
219. Thompson, 382 F.3d at 369.
220. Id. at 383.
221. Id. at 378 (quoting Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 388
(2002), affd 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Tax Court first expressed the "recycling of
value" idea in Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, in which the bona fide sale exception was
denied. See Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1653 (2002) ("[S]uch
instances of pure recycling do not rise to the level of a payment of consideration. To hold
otherwise would open section 2036 to a myriad of abuses engendered by unilateral paper
transformations.").
222. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 380.
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and protection. '223  Furthermore, in Thompson the court concluded
that there was no purpose for the transfer other than tax savings and
cited United States Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that
such a transfer is not a "bona fide sale" within the meaning of
§ 2036.224 Then the court noted that in Kimbell, a bona fide sale was
found because the transaction was entered into for "substantial
business and other non-tax purposes. "225
However, the courts disagree about what can constitute full and
adequate consideration. In Kimbell, the Fifth Circuit held there was
full and adequate consideration if the donor-decedent received
interests in the FLP proportionate to the property she contributed to
the FLP, even if the fair market value of the FLP interests was less
than the fair market value of the contributed property.226 The Third
Circuit disagreed that receipt of interests worth less than the fair
market value of the transferred assets would always constitute full
consideration so long as the interests received were proportionate.
The Third Circuit reasoned that if assets are transferred for assets of
lesser value (e.g., limited partnership interests), "there is no transfer
for 'adequate and full consideration' because the decedent has not
replenished the estate with other assets of equal value.
'228
Furthermore, the concurring opinion in Thompson directly
questioned the Fifth Circuit's position.229 Judge Greenberg quoted
the Kimbell court's discussion of the "informed trade-off" 230 that a
person makes when she transfers marketable assets for unmarketable,
managed limited partnership interests and then queried whether the
223. Id.
224. Id. at 383 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
225. Id. at 383 (citing Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 266, 267 (5th Cir. 2004)).
226. Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 266.
227. See id. at 261-65 (discussing Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749 (5th Cir.
1997)). In Kimbell, the court relied on Wheeler, an earlier Fifth Circuit case applying
§ 2036(a) for the principle that a bona fide sale between family members is possible so
long as the transaction is not a sham and "adequate and full consideration" is received
such that the estate is not depleted. Id. at 262-63. The Kimbell court also pointed out that
if FLP interests proportionate to the fair market value of the property transferred to the
FLP are credited to the transferor, adequate and full consideration exists. Id. at 266. The
Third Circuit in Thompson also cited Wheeler for the principle that for adequate and full
consideration to be found, a transfer should not deplete the estate of the transferor.
Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381. But then the Thompson court surmised that an estate has
been depleted if what a transferor receives in exchange for assets transferred to the FLP is
an interest "of lesser value" (for example, unmarketable minority interests). Id.
228. Thompson, 382 F.3d at 381.
229. See id. at 386-87 (Greenberg, J., concurring).
230. See Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 266. The Kimbell court recognized that market value is
not the only measure of value to a transferor, who may value the management a
partnership provides.
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Fifth Circuit considered that to avoid § 2036(a) recapture, "the
property transferred must be 'replaced by property of equal value
that could be exposed to inclusion in the decedent's gross estate,' on a
'money or money's worth' basis. ' 231  Thus, the Third and Fifth
Circuits are not aligned on what the meaning of "adequate and full
consideration" means under § 2036(a).
C. Bongard
Further adding to the uncertainty about the meaning of the bona
fide sale exception to § 2036 are the recent pronouncements by the
full Tax Court in Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner.232 In Bongard,
some of the bad facts of earlier FLP cases were missing in that the
decedent was middle-aged and not elderly when the FLPs in question
were created, and he did not disregard the FLPs' existence before his
unexpected death two years later at age fifty-eight.233 Before his
death, the decedent, Wayne Bongard, first set up an LLC as a holding
company to which he transferred all of his and all of a preexisting
irrevocable trust's shares of Empak, a successful closely-held
corporation of which Bongard was the sole shareholder.3 In return
for transferring these shares, he received voting and nonvoting units
in the LLC.235 Later, Bongard created an FLP to which he transferred
all of his nonvoting units in the LLC in exchange for a ninety-nine
percent limited partner interest and some of the irrevocable trust's
nonvoting units in the LLC in exchange for a one percent general
partner interest.236 After Bongard died unexpectedly while on a trip
to Austria,237 the IRS assessed his estate with a nearly $53 million
federal estate tax deficiency.238 The issues before the Tax Court were
whether or not either the stock transferred to the LLC or the LLC
231. Thompson, 382 F.3d at 387 n.24 (Greenberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
232. A "reviewed decision," Bongard represents the views of seventeen Tax Court
judges. Eleven judges comprised the majority opinion, with one of those concurring in the
result only. See Estate of Bongard v. Comm'r, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 1124.8, at
124-54, 124-26 (T.C. Mar. 15, 2005). Judge Laro wrote separately, concurring in the result
but "uncomfortable with the analysis." See id. (Laro, J., with whom Marvel, J., joins,
concurring). Judge Halpern and Judge Chiechi each wrote separate opinions concurring
in part and dissenting in part, with two other judges agreeing with Judge Chiechi's opinion.
See id. at 124-80 (Halpern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 124-85
(Chiechi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. Id. at 124-55 to -57 (majority opinion).
234. Id. at 124-56.
235. See id. at 124-58 to -59.
236. See id. at 124-61.
237. Id. at 124-57.
238. Id. at 124-55.
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units transferred to the FLP should be included in Bongard's estate
under § 2036(a). 39 In determining that the transfer of Empak stock
to the LLC was a "bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration"
and thus outside § 2036, the Tax Court laid out a seemingly new
standard for bona fide sales.240 Finally, the Tax Court stated that the
LLC units transferred to the FLP should be included in Bongard's
estate under § 2036(a) because the bona fide sale exception did not
apply and the decedent maintained "practical control" over the FLP,
which the Tax Court determined was an appropriate basis for finding
retained enjoyment under § 2036(a)(1). 4 ' In rendering these
decisions, the Tax Court cited both Kimbell and Thompson but
formulated a unique test for the bona fide sale exception.242
Regarding the bona fide sale exception, the Bongard majority
stated that where the estate establishes "a legitimate and significant
nontax reason for creating a family limited partnership, ... the
adequate and full consideration exception is met if the transferors
received partnership interests proportionate to the value of the
property transferred. ' 243 The proportionate interest prong is similar
to the test articulated in Kimbell,24 but the "legitimate and significant
239. Id.
240. See id. at 124-68 ("[T]he bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration
exception is met where the record establishes the existence of a legitimate and significant
nontax reason for creating the family limited partnership, and the transferors received
partnership interests proportionate to the value of property transferred."); Burgess J.W.
Raby & William L. Raby, Business Purpose, Bona Fide Sale, and Family Limited
Partnerships, Tax Notes Today (Tax Analysts) No. 2005-5964, at 1 (Mar. 22, 2005),
available at http://www .lawprofessorblogs.com/taxprof/linkdocs/2005-5964.pdf.
241. See Bongard, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) $ 124.8, at 124-73 to -74. After
determining that the bona fide sale exception did not apply to the formation of the FLP
(because the nontax reasons advanced by the estate for its formation were unpersuasive
and not "significant"), the Tax Court went on to determine that § 2036(a)(1) did apply to
the FLP assets, because Bongard maintained "practical control" over the FLP. See id.
While the focus of this Comment is the confusion surrounding the meaning of the bona
fide sale exception in § 2036, the use of a decedent's "practical control" over the assets of
an FLP as a basis for returning those assets to the estate under § 2036(a)(1) is a new and
controversial interpretation of retained enjoyment of the property under § 2036(a)(1). See
generally Milford B. Hatcher, Jr. & Edward M. Manigault, The Tax Court's 'Practical
Control' Test in Bongard: More Than FLPs Are in the Balance, 102 J. TAX'N 261 (2005)
(criticizing the Bongard majority's analysis of "retained enjoyment"). An implied
agreement of retained enjoyment of the assets is enough for a finding of retained
enjoyment. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (2005). However, in Bongard, the Tax Court
elevated a "power of persuasion" on the part of the taxpayer to an implied agreement of
retained enjoyment through "practical control" of the FLP. See Hatcher & Manigault,
supra, at 268.
242. Bongard, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) $ 124.8, at 124-72 to -73.
243. See id. at 124-76 (Laro, J., concurring).
244. See Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 266 (5th Cir. 2004).
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nontax reason" prong may broaden the circumstances under which
taxpayers may evade § 2036(a)(1).
245
In applying the "legitimate and significant nontax reason" rule to
the Bongard family entities, the Tax Court implied some of the
nontax purposes it would consider legitimate enough to make a
transfer to a family entity bona fide. First, the Tax Court addressed
the LLC holding company to which the bona fide sale exception did
apply. The court found that "the positioning and structuring of
Empak to facilitate a corporate liquidity event" was a "legitimate and
significant nontax reason" motivating the decedent to create the LLC
holding company.246 The Tax Court also discussed asset pooling as a
significant nontax reason for formation of the LLC.24 7
Then, the Tax Court addressed the FLP to which it found the
bona fide exception did not apply. The estate advanced several
nontax reasons for forming the FLP to which the Tax Court
determined the bona fide sale exception did not apply.248 The nontax
reasons proffered by the estate included investment management,
credit protection, facilitation of a postmarital agreement, and
facilitation of gift-making.2 49 Although the Tax Court rejected each
of these rationales for forming the FLP on the Bongard facts, by
addressing them, the Tax Court intimated that under the right factual
circumstances they might qualify as significant and legitimate nontax
reasons.
250
In addition to providing yet another explication of the bona fide
sale exception to § 2036, the Bongard case also featured four
separately authored opinions by judges weighing in on the majority's
reasoning. A brief analysis of a couple of these opinions illustrates
further that the meaning of the bona fide sale exception under § 2036
is unsettled. Judge Laro's concurring opinion indicated he would
require, for adequate and full consideration, not only proportionate
interests to be transferred to the party making a transfer to an FLP
but also that the transferor's estate not be depleted by the transfer.2 11
This appears similar to the requirements of the Fifth Circuit in
245. See Korpics, supra note 20, at 34-35.
246. Bongard, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 124.8, at 124-69 to -70.
247. Id. at 124-70 to -71.
248. See id. at 124-70 to -73.
249. Id.
250. See Korpics, supra note 20, at 34-35. Courts often reject mundane nontax reasons
on the facts before them, as the Tax Court did in Bongard with respect to the FLP. Id. at
35. Kimbell is a notable exception, but there the court focused extensively on the actual
business operations of the FLPs. Id.
251. See Bongard, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) T 124.8, at 124-76 to -77.
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Kimbell. 2 2 Furthermore, Judge Laro would adhere to the business
purpose test of Gregory v. Helvering253 rather than the "legitimate and
significant nontax reasons" test. Judge Laro notes that the Third
Circuit applied the business purpose test in Thompson.254
Another judge, Judge Halpern, concurred in part and dissented
in part, noting that in determining whether the bona fide sale
exception applied, he would first ask if the transfer to the FLP was
made in the ordinary course of business. 5 If not, he would then only
consider the transfer a bona fide sale if it was made for "full value
(i.e., [if] the value of the transferred property at most equaled the
cash value of the consideration received therefor). '256 Judge Halpern
apparently rejected the proportionate interest test that the majority
espouses and demanded even more than Judge Laro would under the
depletion test.
25 7
Adopting much of the reasoning of Kimbell but offering a
different and potentially broader way for taxpayers to come within
the bona fide sale exception to § 2036, the Tax Court in Bongard has
further fanned the flames of uncertainty surrounding § 2036.
Furthermore, Bongard illustrates once again that the manipulation of
facts and a court's whims can make or break an FLP for purposes of
§ 2036(a)(1).
D. Recent Applications of Section 2036(a) (1): Bigelow, Korby,
Schutt, and Strangi IV
Since Kimbell, Thompson, and Bongard, both the Fifth Circuit
and the Tax Court have reviewed FLP cases under § 2036(a). This
Section of the Comment will briefly review these recent decisions
interpreting the major cases and conclude that, far from clarifying the
uncertainty in the courts' language and tests, these decisions illustrate
the ambiguity.
First, the Tax Court has continued to find, citing Kimbell,
Thompson, and Bongard, that assets held by FLPs should be returned
to estates.258 In two "bad facts" Tax Court cases, Estate of Korby v.
252. See Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004).
253. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
254. Bongard, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 124.8, at 124-79 (Laro, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 124-81 (Halpern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. Id. at 124-83.
257. See id.
258. See Estate of Korby v. Comm'r ("Korby "), 102 T.C.M. (RIA) 697, 706 (2005);
Estate of Korby v. Comm'r ("Korby I"), 103 T.C.M. (RIA) 707, 716 (2005); Estate of
Bigelow v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (RIA) 431,441 (2005).
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Commissioner2 59 and Estate of Bigelow v. Commissioner,26 the court
found on those bad facts that the bona fide sale exception did not
apply.
261
However, in a May 2005 decision, Estate of Schutt v.
Commissioner,262 the Tax Court found that § 2036 did not apply to
two Delaware business trusts formed only a year before a decedent's
death.263 Other than the decedent's advanced age at the time of the
formation of the trusts, the facts in Schutt were not as ugly as in other
§ 2036 cases.26  Like in Thompson, the Schutt trusts, which held
stock, did not engage in trading or other investment activity, but
unlike in Thompson, Schutt maintained assets outside of the trusts for
his own needs and did not commingle his assets with those of the
trusts.265 Addressing the bona fide sale exception, the Tax Court
noted that an appeal in Schutt would go before the Third Circuit, and
suggested that the Third Circuit's approach of requiring a transfer to
be made in good faith "correlates with" the Tax Court's requirement
of a legitimate and significant nontax purpose for a transfer.2' The
court then accepted the estate's argument that a significant nontax
purpose for the transfer of long-held stock to the two trusts was the
furtherance of the decedent's "buy and hold investment
philosophy. '267  The court then concluded that the decedent had
received full and adequate consideration for the transfer of stock to
the trusts because the factors enumerated in Bongard were met.26
One of these factors is that the decedent "received an interest
proportionate in value to [his] contribution. ' 269  This aspect of the
259. 102 T.C.M. (RIA) 697 (2005); 103 T.C.M. (RIA) 707 (2005) (involving the estates
of both a husband and a wife, hence two cases and two opinions).
260. 65 T.C.M. (RIA) 431 (2005).
261. See Korby 1, 102 T.C.M. (RIA) at 704-05 (focusing on facts like the Korbys' use of
the FLP assets for basic living expenses in finding the transfer of assets to the FLP not a
bona fide sale); Bigelow, 65 T.C.M. (RIA) at 440-41 (finding that the transfer of real
property to a partnership was not a bona fide sale where the partnership formalities were
not respected and no nontax benefit flowed to the transferor).
262. 126 T.C.M. (RIA) 989 (2005).
263. See id. at 1003, 1012.
264. See id. at 990-1003 (summarizing findings of fact).
265. See id. at 1001, 1003, 1011.
266. Id. at 1006.
267. Id. at 1007.
268. See id. at 1012.
269. Id. The Schutt court addressed Thompson briefly, stating that the Third Circuit's
view is that "the dissipated value resulting from a transfer to a closely held entity does not
automatically constitute inadequate consideration for section 2036(a) purposes." Id. at
1011 (citing Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 381 (3d Cir. 2004)). However,
the Schutt court ignored the Thompson concurrence, in which two of the three judges
indicated that receipt of proportionate interests in the family entity where the value of the
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holding is troubling in light of the fact that the Third Circuit is unclear
on whether receipt of proportionate interests is full and adequate
consideration or a mere recycling of value. Thus, it is possible that
the Third Circuit would have reached a different conclusion in Schutt
on the question of whether the decedent received full and adequate
consideration for the transfer of stock to the business trusts.
The Fifth Circuit also took another look at an FLP case in the
summer of 2005 in Strangi IV.2 70 Strangi IV was, however, familiar to
the Fifth Circuit as the court had earlier remanded the case to the Tax
Court in Strangi 11.271 On remand, the Tax Court ruled in Strangi III
that the value of the assets transferred to an FLP and its corporate
general partner were includable in the decedent's gross estate under
either subsection 2036(a)(1) or (2).272 While some commentators
suggested that the Fifth Circuit after Kimbell would reverse the Tax
Court on all counts 273 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
holding, reasoning that § 2036(a)(1) applied to return the underlying
assets of the FLP to the Strangi estate.274
The Strangi IV court used the Kimbell formulations of what
constitutes "adequate and full consideration" and "bona fide sale.
2 75
interests received was less than the value of the underlying assets represented a mere
recycling of value and not full and adequate consideration. See Thompson, 382 F.3d at 386
(Greenberg, J., concurring) (quoting and rejecting language in Estate of Stone v. Comm'r,
86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 581 (2003)).
270. The Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments in Strangi IV on March 8, 2005. See Fifth
Circuit Oral Argument Calendar, http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/calendar/0503/24.htm
(last visited Dec. 9, 2005). The court announced its decision in Strangi IV in July 2005.
Strangi IV, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005).
271. See Strangi 11, 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the Tax Court had
abused its discretion in failing to grant the IRS leave to amend its petition to include a
claim under § 2036).
272. See Strangi I1, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1340, 1343 (2003), affd sub nom. Strangi
IV, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005). The holding that § 2036(a)(2) applied, "because as a
limited partner [Strangi] could join with other partners to liquidate the entity," shocked
commentators and practitioners, because it went so much further than previous decisions
applying § 2036. Bray, supra note 167, at 1; see Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 146, at
1170 (concluding that Strangi Il's alternative holding is of "doubtful validity").
Because no other case has followed Strangi lll's alternative holding and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the judgment applying § 2036 on other grounds, its possible effect on FLPs is
beyond the scope of this Comment. See Strangi IV, 417 F.3d at 482 (affirming the Tax
Court on its § 2036(a)(1) holding and not addressing § 2036(a)(2)).
273. Cf. Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Michael L. Graham, Estate of Kimbell: Its
Potential Effect on Strangi Type FLPs (2004), http://www.ilsdocs.com/docs/alerts/estate
_ofKimbell.pdf (stating that while "it is too early to make a definite call" regarding the
outcome of Strangi IV, "many practitioners" believed Kimbell meant that the Fifth Circuit
would reverse Strangi III).
274. Strangi IV, 417 F.3d at 481-82.
275. Id. at 478-79.
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Because the donor received proportionate interests in the FLP for his
transfer of assets to the FLP, the "adequate and full consideration"
prong was met under Kimbell.276 But in reviewing the Tax Court's
decision on whether there had been a bona fide sale for clear error,
the Fifth Circuit held that the Tax Court did not clearly err, finding
that there was no "substantial business or other non-tax" purpose for
the transfer.277 Note that under Thompson, receipt of proportionate
interests in the FLP may not constitute full consideration 78 and
under Bongard, a sale can purportedly be bona fide where there is
any "legitimate and significant nontax reason" for the transfer,
regardless of whether there is a business reason.279
E. What These Decisions Mean for Estate Planners
The different tests articulated by the circuit courts and the Tax
Court pose problems for estate planners wishing to utilize FLPs for
their clients. 8 °  Certainly, estate planners must be selective in
presenting FLPs to their clients as planning vehicles.281' The
partnership should be respected and the letter of the agreement
followed. The decedent should retain sufficient assets on which to
live comfortably without resorting to the transferred assets.282 Based
upon Bongard, there should be "legitimate and significant nontax
reason[s]" to form the FLP, and these should probably include
business purposes.28 3  These reasons should be documented and
276. Id. at 478 (noting that even the IRS conceded the decedent received proportionate
interests in the partnership for the assets he transferred).
277. Id. at 479.
278. See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 378-81 (2004).
279. See Estate of Bongard v. Comm'r, 124 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 124.8 (RIA), at
124-54, 124-68 (T.C. Mar. 15, 2005).
280. See Harrison & Newlin, supra note 160, at 23-26.
281. Id. at 33.
282. See Bissonnette, supra note 3, at 78; Lieb, supra note 66, at 910.
283. See Korpics, supra note 20, at 34. Korpics notes that, while courts have intimated
that they would accept a variety of "plain vanilla" nontax reasons, they often reject these
on the facts before them as the Tax Court did in Bongard with respect to the FLP. Id. at
35. Korpics suggests that estate planners should ensure that FLPs have a "noteworthy
purpose" like the creditor protection rationale in Kimbell where "potential environmental
liability was a concern" or the preparation for an initial public offering successfully
advanced in Bongard with respect to the LLC. Id.; see Harrison & Newlin, supra note 160,
at 24-31. Note that the Fifth Circuit in Kimbell found on those facts that there were
"substantial business and other non-tax reasons" to form the FLPs. See Kimbell v. United
States, 371 F.3d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 2004). But when looking at the proffered reasons there
and in Thompson, it is not clear how "substantial" Kimbell's other reasons really were.
See Harrison & Newlin, supra note 160, at 31. Harrison and Newlin suggest that perhaps
"substantial" is to be read as "real, actual and genuine." Id. But Thompson probably
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actually addressed. Also, it is unclear how much and what type of an
interest a decedent must receive in the FLP in exchange for her
contribution.2 s
Under Kimbell or Bongard, a decedent could transfer $2.7
million to an FLP with a total of $3 million in funding and then retain
a ninety percent limited partnership interest.85  This interest,
proportionate to the ninety percent of equity contributed to the FLP
by the decedent, would constitute full and adequate consideration
even though the limited partnership interest would be valued at less
than $2.7 million.2 6 Under Thompson, this would likely not be the
case. It would seem that the decedent would have to retain
something that had a fair market value of $2.7 million for there to be
full and adequate consideration.287 One way to do this would be for
the decedent to "retain a general partner interest sufficient to allow
termination of the partnership ... to avoid the ... argument that what
was received back is less than what was contributed for purposes of
section 2036's exception for adequate and full consideration. '28
Without knowing what constitutes adequate and full consideration
under § 2036, using FLPs for estate planning may be more risky than
beneficial.
Again, the different language employed by the various courts in
defining the contours of the bona fide sale exception to § 2036(a)
illustrates the uncertainty about how and whether this Code provision
should be applied to FLPs. If § 2036(a)(1) is applied to FLPs, the
approach to full and adequate consideration laid out in Kimbell (and
followed in Strangi IV) and the similar Bongard approach will likely
win out over the more restrictive Thompson approach. If receipt of
proportionate interests in the partnership for transferred assets is to
be considered full and adequate consideration, as in Kimbell and
Bongard, the problem for courts will be that so long as partnership
formalities are observed it will be difficult to apply § 2036(a)(1) to
return FLP assets to an estate. This is so because the donor-decedent
will almost always receive proportionate interests in the FLP for his
transferred assets. If receipt of proportionate interests in the
requires something more, so planners should be careful to make sure these nontax reasons
exist for their clients before suggesting FLPs. See id.
284. See Harrison & Newlin, supra note 160, at 32.
285. See id. (offering a similar illustration of the rule using slightly different numbers
and referring only to Kimbell).
286. Id. (illustrating the Kimbell rule using different dollar values).
287. See id.
288. Id. at 24.
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partnership for transferred assets is not considered full and adequate
consideration (unless the fair market value of the interests is equal to
that of the assets), as at least two judges on the Thompson panel
advocate, § 2036(a)(1) may apply more often to FLPs. However, and
unfortunately, this approach ignores the reality that even though FLP
interests would not receive the same price on the market as would the
underlying assets, partnership interests are valuable to the donor in
other ways-including "management expertise, security and
preservation of assets, capital appreciation and avoidance of personal
liability. '289 While the result under a Thompson approach might be
favorable to the government and to those who recognize the possible
abuses of FLPs, the approach is not economically sensible because
the only type of "value" it considers is the actual dollar value of the
assets or interests exchanged. To accomplish the same result more
appropriately while offering estate planners and taxpayers
predictability and guidance, the only remedy is a Code provision
expressly dealing with FLPs and similar family entities. Such a
remedy is discussed further in Part V of this Comment.
V. LEGISLATIVE REMEDY
The best way to resolve these uncertainties, allow substance to
prevail over form, and fairly treat similarly situated taxpayers the
same is for Congress to add a Code provision that specifically
addresses entities like FLPs. Family entities are potentially abusive,
and it is inappropriate that whether § 2036 applies in a particular case
depends more on the form in which the assets are owned and the
court's view of the subjective motives for selecting such form rather
than on the substantive nature of the party's relationship to the assets.
Congress is better equipped than courts to change "generally
accepted interpretations of tax law" that have been relied upon by
taxpayers for years, because, among other reasons, Congress gives
taxpayers notice of changes to the law.29° Section 2036, while
seemingly an effective weapon against FLPs right now, is weak and
unfair,291 as for years the IRS itself indicated it did not apply to
FLPs 29 2 and its application seems dependent on bad facts like those in
289. Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 266 (5th Cir. 2004).
290. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 99.
291. See id. at 98; see also Jensen, supra note 21, at 184-86 (calling some courts'
§ 2036(a)(1) arguments "unjustified" and suggesting the section "may be easily avoided").
292. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Jan. 12, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039
(Dec. 16, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-006 (Aug. 20, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-
31-006 (Apr. 30, 1991). Note that Private Letter Rulings have no precedential value and
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Thompson and the Strangi cases.293 With the possibility of the
Supreme Court addressing the § 2036 issue,294 the IRS should not be
too confident that this weapon will remain in its arsenal.295
Furthermore, even if § 2036 does remain an effective weapon against
FLPs, sophisticated estate planners and clients are keeping their eyes
on the pronouncements of the courts and are increasingly able to
avoid the bad facts that plagued the estates in Thompson, the Strangi
cases, and other cases.296 In effect, practitioners can use the cases as
blueprints and structure FLPs like those that have been respected by
the courts to avoid the pitfalls that led to the disrespect of others.
Legislation is preferable to ad-hoc, awkward application of § 2036 in
the courts.
Legislation dealing with the problem of FLPs (and in fact
proposing much of the same reform discussed above) has been
attempted before with no resulting Code provision or regulations
enacted.297 In January 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation, in its
taxpayers are instructed not to rely on them, but they do offer taxpayers insight into how
the IRS will apply the Code to fact patterns. See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2000).
293. See Jensen, supra note 21, at 185-86 (listing the facts present in § 2036 cases that
support a finding of refusing a discount and suggesting these "pitfalls" are easily avoided).
It remains unclear why § 2036 suddenly applies to FLPs, when for years even the IRS
conceded it did not. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Aug. 2, 1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 97-10-021 (Mar. 7, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Apr. 15, 1994); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (Mar. 12, 1993); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-004 (Nov. 15, 1985);
Jerry A. Kasner, Applying Byrum to Family Business Entities, 96 TAX NOTES 1741, 1741-
43 (2002); Michael D. Mulligan, Courts Err in Applying Section 2036(a) to Limited
Partnerships, 30 EST. PLAN. 486, 490-94 (2003); see also Novack, supra note 63, at 450
(suggesting that the IRS auditors seek out "taxpayers who make sloppy mistakes");
Harvey N. Shapiro, The Many Advantages of Family Limited Partnerships, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, May 17, 2005, at 5, available at www.law.com/jsp/pa/index.jsp (noting
that many estate tax returns with FLPs are audited but that where valid purposes for
forming the FLP exist and the FLP is maintained properly, discounts will likely still be
allowed).
294. See Easton, supra note 11, at 41; Larry E. Ribstein, Family Limited Partnerships:
The Latest Chapter, IDEOBLOG, Sept. 22, 2004, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/
2004/09/family-limited_.html. Ribstein is a law professor at the University of Illinois
College of Law. His scholarship focuses on unincorporated business entities and
partnerships.
295. See generally Kasner, supra note 293, at 1743 (arguing that the Strangi and Harper
courts have come "dangerously close" to expanding § 2036 so that its application conflicts
with the holding in Byrum); Mulligan, supra note 293, at 494 (arguing that courts have
misapplied § 2036 and advocating adoption of a substance over form analysis).
296. See Jensen, supra note 21, at 184-86; Korpics, supra note 20, at 32.
297. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 396-404 (Comm. Print 2005), available
at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf (proposing limiting the availability of minority and
lack of marketability discounts through aggregation rules and a look-through rule); H.
Amdt. 171 (Pomeroy) to Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act of 2003, H.R. 8, 108th Cong.
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four-hundred plus page tome Options to Improve Tax Compliance
and Reform Tax Expenditures, proposed limiting minority and lack of
marketability discounts for transfers of interests in FLPs or similar
entities.298 The Joint Committee on Taxation's recent proposals
generally deal with the transfer of an interest in an FLP by a donor-
decedent and suggest situations in which the interests transferred by
the donor or donor-decedent should be valued at their value before
the underlying assets were transferred to the FLP.299
Besides adopting the Joint Committee on Taxation's recent
proposals, there are a number of additional ways Congress could
curtail the potential abuses of FLPs.3 °° Practitioner and commentator
Daniel H. Ruttenberg suggests that chapter 14 of subtitle B of the
Internal Revenue Code, containing special valuation rules for transfer
tax purposes,30 1 might be an appropriate place to add legislation
regarding FLPs and valuation discounts.3" In such legislation,
Congress could choose to "deny[] all valuation discounts when an
entity is owned almost entirely by a donor-decedent" and members of
his or her family.30 3 An analogous issue is addressed in § 2036(b),
(2003) (proposing to increase the estate tax exclusion amount to $3 million while curtailing
the ability to claim valuation discounts on nonbusiness and family entities, but this
proposal was defeated soundly in the House of Representatives on June 18, 2003).
298. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 297, at 402-03.
299. See id. at 403 (proposing aggregation rules and a look-through rule to value the
partnership interests transferred by the donor or donor-decedent at what their value was
in the hands of the transferor).
300. See generally Ruttenberg, supra note 66 (suggesting ways Congress could legislate
to curb abuses of valuation discounts).
301. See I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (2000).
302. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 100. Ruttenberg's excellent article addresses § 2036
in more breadth than does this Comment; he discusses how both § 2036(a)(1) and
§ 2036(a)(2) can be applied to return FLP assets to the estate of the decedent. See id. at
55-65. However, Ruttenberg's article was published before the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Strangi IV. See Strangi IV, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005). While affirming the Tax Court's
§ 2036(a)(1) holding, the fact that the Fifth Circuit did not address § 2036(a)(2) perhaps
lessens the force of Ruttenberg's concerns regarding § 2036(a)(2)'s application to family
entities. Furthermore, this Comment argues forcefully for legislation from Congress
dealing with abuses of FLPs, while Ruttenberg seems to suggest that Congress should
legislate only if it determines that valuation discounts generally are abusive-and that if it
does not so find, the Tax Court should simply stop applying this inappropriate provision
where it believes that claimed valuation discounts are abusive but there is no real retained
"substantial present economic benefits from transferred assets" as § 2036(a)(1) requires.
See Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 98.
303. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 99. Ruttenberg suggests, persuasively, that the level
of ownership by family members that should preclude valuation discounts should neither
be too high that it renders the preclusion meaningless nor too low that it includes too
many family entities and discourages their use for appropriate means. This bright line rule
would either be under- or over-inclusive depending on where the line is drawn (e.g.,
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dealing with when retention of voting rights in shares of stock will be
considered "retention of the enjoyment of transferred property" for
purposes of the § 2036(a)(1) inquiry. 3°4  Specifically, retention of
voting rights will be considered retained enjoyment when the stock
transferred is stock in a "controlled corporation," defined as a
corporation in which the decedent owned or had the right to vote at
least twenty percent of the voting stock at any time after the transfer
of the stock and within three years of the decedent's death.3 °5
Furthermore, if the decedent's spouse, children, grandchildren, or
parents own stock, such ownership will be aggregated and considered
ownership by the decedent for purposes of § 2036(b)(2). °6 Such
aggregation rules could also be applied in the case of an FLP, such
that valuation discounts could be denied when an entity is
substantially owned by a decedent and her family members.
Congress could alternately or also require that a certain amount
of a family entity's assets consist of an active business before
permitting valuation discounts. 7 It could require that unrelated
owners hold a "substantial minority interest (e.g., ten percent) before
a valuation discount is allowed.
308
All of these proposed changes would limit abuses of FLPs.
Particularly attractive are denials of discounts for entities owned
mostly by family members with exceptions for those entities carrying
on active business activities. Legislation could be drafted to allow
legitimate nontax purposes to be served without also encouraging tax
avoidance. Whatever approach Congress takes, the IRS and the
Department of Treasury should then promulgate detailed,
explanatory regulations that will provide guidance to taxpayers and
practitioners seeking to form and operate family entities within the
bounds of the law, currently a very difficult proposition given the
inconsistency in the courts.
CONCLUSION
FLPs provide sophisticated taxpayers and their lawyers creative
ways to potentially avoid estate taxation in addition to other benefits.
whether fifty-one percent, seventy-five percent, ninety-nine percent, or some other level of
ownership constituted enough ownership to trigger denial of discounts). Id. at 100.
304. See I.R.C. § 2036(b). Until now, this Comment has not addressed § 2036(b)
because that section deals with corporate stock, not unincorporated family entities like
FLPs.
305. Id. § 2036(b)(2).
306. See id. (referring to id. § 318).
* 307. Ruttenberg, supra note 66, at 100.
308. Id.
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FLPs can easily be abused through savvy planning, especially where
the laws regarding them are interpreted so inconsistently. There is a
need for appropriate legislation that ensures that similarly situated
taxpayers like the neighbors discussed in the Introduction of this
Comment do not shoulder such differing tax burdens simply because
one of them held her money in substantively the same way but in a
different form than her neighbor. Currently, the IRS seems to value
form over substance in attacking FLPs.
The Third and Fifth Circuits do not agree on what constitutes a
"bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration" under § 2036(a)
and thus do not agree on what an FLP must do to avoid § 2036
application. Adding to this uncertainty, the Tax Court, citing both
Third and Fifth Circuit decisions, came up with yet a different
permutation of the bona fide sale exception. All of these decisions
create uncertainty for estate planners and for taxpayers.
The IRS is right to attack the valuation discounts being claimed
by these taxpayers as abusive, but its new weapon-of-choice, § 2036, is
being inappropriately and awkwardly applied to FLPs. The different
and conflicting interpretations of the meaning of "bona fide sale for
adequate and full consideration" in § 2036 reflect the fact that this
section of the Internal Revenue Code is a poor fit for family entities.
With only § 2036 in its arsenal, the IRS can never do more than target
the most abusive of cases involving the worst fact patterns, and the
courts must engage in an inappropriate guessing game regarding the
subjective motives of the taxpayer. A properly planned and
administered FLP can avoid § 2036 by taking the requirements of the
various courts to address FLPs and tailoring FLPs to meet the most
stringent requirements any court has enumerated. Thus, current
application of § 2036 to an FLP depends on sloppy planning and
administration of an FLP. The judicial uncertainty arising from
conflicting precedent in Kimbell, Thompson, Bongard, Schutt, and
Strangi IV necessitates legislative intervention. A more appropriate
solution can be found through corrective action by Congress, which
can pass legislation specifically addressing these family entities and
limiting valuation discounts for such entities unless certain
enumerated conditions are met.
ANDREA B. SHORT*
* The author wishes to thank Mark Bookman for suggesting this topic and for his
thoughtful comments throughout the writing process. All errors are the author's own.
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